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Abstract
This essay conceptualizes radicalization as a collective process that evolves within the context of global,
national, or local intergroup tensions. People do not radicalize on their own, but as part of a group in
which a collective identity is developed. Some members of the group may take a radical activist route
to promote or prevent social change. Their interactions with their opponents intensify, while their ideas
and beliefs sharpen. In this essay, I propose an interpretative framework to analyze radicalizing collective
identities. The framework departs from the notion that supranational processes shape and mold the micro
level of (radicalizing) citizens’ demands, the meso level of social movements and political parties, and the
macro level of national political systems. The answer to questions such as who radicalizes, why people
radicalize, and the forms radical action takes lies in the interaction of supranational processes, national
political processes, and the context of political mobilization. It is argued that radicalizing identities are
key in this process, no radicalization without identiﬁcation!
Q2When do people go beyondmoderate collective action to choose more extreme, radical forms of
action? Research on both conventional collective action and political violence suggests that
radical forms of action are usually preceded by more moderate forms of support. In the social
movement literature, Klandermans (1997; Q3Oegema&Klandermans, 1994) identiﬁed four distinct
stages of social movement engagement, from being a sympathizer, to becoming an active
participant. Similarly, in the political violence literature, scholars have emphasized the incremental
nature of engagement in radical action, utilizing a staircase metaphor (e.g. Moghaddam 2005).
Indeed, in both the social movement and political violence literatures, there has been a well-
articulated need to understand commitment to collective efforts to bring about social change as
a process ( Q4Horgan, 2008). There are two transformations relevant to understanding the process
of becoming a (radical) activist, more speciﬁcally: (i) the shift between sympathy and active
support (Oegema and Klandermans, 1994); and (ii) the shift between support for moderate
collective action and more extreme strategies ( Q5Thomas, 2013). Three processes are particularly
useful for describing these shifts, respectively politicization, polarization, and radicalization.
In this article, I will discuss these three processes. I argue that politicization and polarization are
interrelated but different processes both nested in the process of radicalization. Finally, I will ven-
ture an initial conceptualization of contextualized radicalization. However, I will start off with an
exploration of the role of social identiﬁcation in moderate and radical collective action.1 This is
because identiﬁcation processes play a crucial role in politicization, polarization and radicalization.
In fact, I argue that there is no radicalizationwithout identiﬁcation (cf. Van Stekelenburg et al. 2010).
Identity & politicization, polarization, and radicalization
Radicalization due to group grievances – when people perceive harm inﬂicted on a group
that they belong to or have sympathy for – accounts for the larger portion of political and
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ethnic radical violence (McCauley and Moskalenko 2008). The more people identify with a
group at stake, the higher the chances they are willing to ﬁght for that group (Van Stekelenburg
2013). Hence, identity processes play an important role in radicalization processes.
Identity is our understanding of who we are and who other people are and reciprocally
other people’s understanding of themselves and others (Jenkins 2004). As for ‘understanding
who we are’, Q6Klandermans and de Weerd (2000) distinguish an individual personal level and
a collective group level. For the individual level, they rely on the distinction made by Q7Tajfel
and Turner (1979), who argue that a person has one personal and several social identities
whereby a personal identity refers to self-deﬁnition in terms of personal attributes, and social
identity refers to self-deﬁnition in terms of group memberships. Collective identity at the
collective group level concerns “the shared deﬁnition of a group that derives from members’
common interests, experiences, and solidarity” (Taylor and Whittier 1992). According to
Klandermans and de Weerd, group identiﬁcation forms the link between collective and social
identity and thus forms the bridge between the individual and collective level of identity.
What is the role of social identity, collective identity, and group identiﬁcation in the context
of radicalization? A focus on identity in the context of radicalization is not new. In fact, it
reﬂects a growing consensus among many radicalization researchers about identity as having
a role in the radicalization process leading to violence (Post 2007). To be clear, these
researchers are not referring to personal identities, but rather social and collective identities.
This can be explained by the large share of radicalization due to group grievances, which,
by deﬁnition, implies social and collective identities.
Social identity
Social identity is seen as a cognitive entity; if one of the many social identities people have be-
comes salient, then people see themselves less as unique individuals and more as the prototypical
representatives of their in-group. People have many social identities that remain latent most of
the time. A particular identity is said to be salient if it is “functioning psychologically to increase
the inﬂuence of one’s membership in that group on perception and behavior” ( Q8Turner et al.,
1987, p. 118). When social identity becomes more salient than personal identity, people think,
feel, and act as members of their group. The notion of identity involves two criteria of compar-
ison between people: ‘sameness’ and ‘distinctiveness’. In the late seventies, a social psychological
identity perspective on protest emerged in the form of social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel &
Turner 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979) showed that social categorization according to some
trivial criterion such as the ‘blue’ or the ‘red’ group sufﬁces to make people feel, think ,and
act as a group member. Compared to this ‘minimal group paradigm’, real-world intergroup
conﬂicts such as the Israeli–Palestinian conﬂict, with histories, high emotional intensity attached
to them, and socio-political consequences can be seen as ‘maximal group paradigms’ that bring
group membership powerfully to mind. When individuals consider themselves as part of a
group, in other words, they identify with that group, this identity becomes psychologically
important, and can be the basis for various behaviors in case of group threat or group grievances,
including moderate and radical collective action participation (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).
Collective identity
Collective identity is conceived as an emergent group phenomenon. According to Melucci
(1985: 793), a collective identity is: “an interactive, shared deﬁnition of the ﬁeld of
opportunities and constraints offered to collective action produced by several individuals that
2 Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization
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must be conceived as a process because it is constructed and negotiated by repeated activation
of the relationships that link individuals to groups”. Hence, identity is not a given fact;
identity is a practical accomplishment, a process. Identifying ourselves or others is a matter
of meaning, and meaning always involves interaction: agreement and disagreement, conven-
tion and innovation, and communication and negotiation (R. Jenkins 2004; Van Doorn et al.
2013). As the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Reicher 1996a,1996b) holds, “identities
should be understood not simply as a set of cognitions but as practical projects”. In this ac-
count, identities and practice are in reciprocal interaction, each mutually enabling and
constraining the other. In other words, collective identities are constantly ‘under construc-
tion’, and collective action is one of the factors that shape collective identity. Taylor
(2013) therefore conceives of social movements as discursive communities held together
not only by common action and bonds of solidarity, but by identities, symbols, shared
identity discourse, and practices of everyday life that attribute participants’ experiences to
particular forms of social injustice. Hence, people do not radicalize on their own, but as part
of a group – a discursive community – in which a collective identity is constructed and
negotiated. Some members of the group may take a radical activist route to promote or
prevent social change. Their interactions with their opponents intensify, while their ideas
and beliefs sharpen.
Politicization, polarization, and radicalization involve tough identity work, all taking place
within the abovementioned discursive communities. Identity work encompasses the range of
activities individuals and groups engage in to give meaning to themselves and others by
selectively presenting or attributing and sustaining identities congruent with their interests
(David A. Snow 2013). Identity work involves boundary work. For instance in the form
of designing and displaying protest placards avowing and attributing contrasting identities
or verbal constructions and assertions as when collectively vocalizing adversarial epithets
during protest events. This type of identity work has been found to be widely practiced, even
among the downtrodden and stigmatized, as in the case of movements and associated protests
among the homeless (D.A. Snow and Anderson 1987).
Identity work involves framing processes entailing the conﬁrmation and accusation of
relevant characteristics. Movement activists and leaders’ identity talk includes identity
attributions about individuals and groups construed as capable of overcoming injustice
or solving the problem the movement has identiﬁed. They include collective identity
claims about the movement and its allies and typically involve positive identity attribu-
tions such as ‘heroes’ and ‘heroines’, ‘innocent victims’, ‘aggrieved populations’, and
‘future generations’. Antagonists – individuals and groups identiﬁed as the movement’s
opponents or ‘enemies’ – are designated as the responsible agents for the problem or
issue the movement seeks to overcome or as obstructionists standing in the way of
the changes the movement seeks. Movement activists and leaders often vilify their
opponents referring to them by caustic labels such as ‘baby killers’, ‘fascists’, ‘capitalist
pigs’, ‘gun grabbers’, and the like ( Q9Benford and Hunt 1992). Such vilifying framing of
the collective character of an antagonist/opponent functions to demarcate boundaries
between ‘us’ and ‘them’, good and evil, and right and wrong. Identity work, ﬁnally,
plays a signiﬁcant role as well when identities fully politicize and the societal context
is differentiated into opponents and (potential) allies. Allied and potential allied social
movement organizations, the media, sympathizers, and bystanders all are presumed to
be persuadable and thus constitute the target of a movement’s ‘consensus mobilization’
efforts (Klandermans 1988) to align themselves with the movement and perhaps even
contribute signiﬁcant resources to the movement. For this reason, a great deal of social
movement identity work is directed towards these audiences.
Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization 3
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Group identiﬁcation
Group identiﬁcation links social identity to collective identity, and thus individuals to groups.
Because group identiﬁcation bridges individual and collective identity processes, it is the
social psychological answer to the question of what drives people to participate in protest.
The stronger the group identiﬁcation, the more shared beliefs and fate are incorporated in
the individual’s social identity and the more people are prepared to take action on behalf
of the group. Q10Huddy (2003) argues that it is not group identiﬁcation per se but the strength
of such identiﬁcation that inﬂuences group members’ readiness to view themselves and act
in terms of their group membership. She criticizes social identity literature for neglecting
the fact that real-world identities vary in strength; identifying more or less strongly with a
group, she argues, may make a real difference, especially in political contexts. Social
movement participation may help people to change their stigmatized or ‘spoiled’ imposed
identities into strong and empowered social movement identities.
Group identiﬁcation is crucial in the process of politicization, polarization, and radicalization.
In particular, the following two identity processes – spurred by strong group identiﬁcation – can
be hold responsible (Turner et al., 1979, 1987): social categorization (seeing oneself as similar to
some group of people and different from others), and in the context of radicalization most im-
portant: self-enhancement (seeing one’s own group positive in relation to relevant out-groups).
Social categorization is a cognitive tool for the ordering of the social environment in terms of
groups and helps people to deﬁne their place in society (Turner et al., 1987). Self-enhancement,
on the other hand, is a reaction to threatened social identities. Group members try to enhance
their social self-esteem by searching for positive group distinctiveness, because any threat to the
position of the group implies a potential loss of positive comparisons ( Q11Haslam, Oakes, Turner, &
McGarty, 1996; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Group members attempt to ‘repair’ their self-esteem
through in-group favoritism and out-group derogation ( Q12Haslam & Turner, 1995; Turner
et al., 1987). By portraying ‘us’ as good and ‘them’ as evil, bipolar group relations create a push
for distinctiveness by which the groups drift apart and polarize and simultaneously radicalize. In
case of protracted bipolar conﬂicts as for instance pro-life and pro-choice movements, each new
incident starts off the whole process again. Important though, from incident to incident social
identiﬁcation becomes stronger and ideas and feelings become more radical (Van Stekelenburg
et al. 2010). Konaev and Moghaddam (2010), for example, showed how President Bush of the
United States and President Ahmadinejad of Iran inﬂuenced both in-group and out-group
through their actions, resulting in a process of mutual radicalization. These two leaders
radicalized each other as well as their respective constituencies.
Politicization & polarization
Politicization and polarization are interrelated but different processes both nested in the
process of radicalization. Identiﬁcation plays a crucial role in all three processes.
Politicization of identities is key to the dynamics of contention. Protest movements are
built on politicized identities, and they are populated by people with politicized identities.
Politicization of identities is thus simultaneously a characteristic of collectivities and people
(Van Stekelenburg et al. 2013). At the individual level, a process of politicization typically
begins with the awareness of shared grievances. The second step is that an external enemy
is blamed for these grievances and claims for compensation are made. The identity fully
politicizes if in the course of this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third parties
such as more powerful authorities (e.g. the national government) or the general public
(Simon and Klandermans 2001). When conﬂicts are augmented by involving society
4 Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization
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(or even the world) at large, the societal context is differentiated into opponents and (potential)
allies. Bystanders are forced to choose sides in a conﬂict, which no longer allows the comfort of
neutrality. They become allies or must accept the consequences of being deemed an enemy.
At the group level, Taylor and Whittier (1992, p. 175) show how strong bonds existing in
social networks contribute to the formation and politicization of collective identities. Within
these networks, individuals come to see themselves as part of a group when some shared
characteristic becomes salient and is deﬁned as important; they become conscious of their
group membership. Consciousness consists of both raising awareness of group membership
and the realization of the group’s position within society, in comparison to other groups.
This position must be perceived as illegitimate or unjust to make group membership politi-
cally relevant. The boundaries of the position are not clear-cut, stable, and objectively given,
but exist in the shared meaning attributed to group membership by group members. Taylor
and Whittier show how women within their networks negotiate in order to change symbolic
meanings of daily life’s thinking and acting ‘the politicization of daily life’. As a result, bound-
aries are drawn between ‘a challenging and a dominant group’ (p. 175). The politicization of
collective identities involves thus a process that unfolds as a sequence of politicizing events
that gradually transform the group’s relationship to its social environment.
This brings us the process of polarization. Polarization deﬁnes other groups in the social
and political arena as allies or opponents. When groups polarize, a strict distinction between
‘us’ and ‘them’ evolves. Both groups assert that what ‘we’ stand for is threatened by ‘them’,
tribute is paid to the in-group’s symbols and values, and the out-group is derogated. An
external enemy is blamed for the group’s predicament, and claims for compensation are
leveled against this enemy. Polarization can be seen as an instance of movement/counter-
movement dynamics in which the in- and out-group ‘keep each other alive’ (Meyer and
Staggenborg 1996). In-group and out-group mutually reinforce each other, identifying
themselves in opposition to each other and regarding the other as the main target of their
actions. The more polarized group relations are and the more politicized its members, the
more likely they will engage in (radical) collective action directed at the government or
the general public to force them to intervene or to take sides.
Radicalization
For Wilkinson (1986, p. 30), political violence is the “deliberate inﬂiction or threat of
inﬂiction of physical injury or damage for political ends”. Della Porta prefers to deﬁne
political violence as a “particular repertoire of collective action that involves physical force,
considered at that time as illegitimate in the dominant culture” (1995, p. 3–4). Moderate so-
cial movements are often internally fragmented along radical and moderate lines over what
constitutes appropriate means and desirable ends (Tarrow 1998). Such within-movement
interactions often lead to breakaway groups seeking more radical goals and actions. In this
shift, members of the group break away from the moderate path and take a radical activist
route to promote or prevent social change. By breaking away, radicalizing group members
thus turn their back on the society at large and on their fellow activists. This means a ‘double
marginalization’, both from society and from the movement (della Porta 1995, p. 107). Such
double marginalization often implies material, social, and psychological isolation. The
group’s isolation is an important factor in explaining its deviation from the ‘normal’
perception of reality (della Porta 1995, p. 186) and strengthens the tendency toward violence
(della Porta 1995, p. 51). In this narrower, ideologically homogeneous network, worldviews
are created largely based on mediated experience, stereotypes, and prejudices shaping even
more detached imagined realities. What group members feel, think, and do is severely restricted.
Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization 5
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In fact, in isolation, no deviance from the group norm is accepted and the degrees of freedom
decline to nearly zero.
WhileWilkinson and della Porte both focus on the repertoire of action, Moghaddam (2005) Q13
considers of radicalization as a process. He conceives the process of radicalization as a multi-story
building with a staircase at its center. People are located on different ﬂoors of the building, but
everyone begins on the ground ﬂoor. Thought and action on each ﬂoor are characterized by
particular psychological processes. The ground ﬂoor starts with subjective interpretations of
material conditions, perceptions of fairness, and adequacy of identity. Only some individuals
move up from the ground ﬂoor to the ﬁrst ﬂoor, in search of ways to improve their life condi-
tions. These individuals attempt to improve their own situation and that of their groups. On this
ﬂoor – the ﬂoor of politicization – they are particularly inﬂuenced by options for individual
mobility and voice.When people feel their voice is listened to during the decision-making pro-
cess, they ‘buy into’ the system. However, when they feel they have no voice, they become
more dissatisﬁed and detached and may climb up to the second ﬂoor – the ﬂoor of polarization
– where they come under the inﬂuence of persuasive messages telling them that the cause of
their problems is external enemies. Some individuals keep climbing up to reach the third ﬂoor,
where they adopt a morality supportive of radicalization. Gradually, those who have reached
the third ﬂoor become separated from the mainstream norms and values of their society, which
generally condemn radical activism. They take on a view supportive of an ‘ends justify the
means’ approach. Those individuals who continue to climb up to the fourth ﬂoor adopt a more
rigid style of categorical ‘us versus them’, ‘good against evil’ thinking. Their world is now
unambiguously divided into ‘black and white’; it is seen as legitimate to attack ‘the forces of evil’
in each and every way feasible. Eventually, some of these individuals move up to the ﬁfth ﬂoor
and take part in and directly support terrorist actions.
The higher people move up the staircase to radicalization, the lower the degrees of
freedom (Moghaddam 2005). Individuals on the ground ﬂoor have a wider range of
behavioral options. After people have become part of a terrorist group or network and
reached the highest ﬂoor, the only options left open to them are to try to kill, or be killed
or captured. Radicalization is thus as a collective intergroup process, rooted in fear and
frustration about group-based feelings of social exclusion and perceived threats. People do
not radicalize on their own but as part of a group and through the socially constructed
‘reality’ of their group. It is a process in which identiﬁcation processes interact with
characteristics of the socio-political context to shape and mold trajectories of change in
individual and groups (Van Stekelenburg and Klandermans 2010).
In conclusion, in the trio of politicization, polarization, and radicalization, identity
processes thus play a crucial role. As for politicization, group identiﬁcation not only
strengthens shared grievances and emotions but also entails identiﬁcation on a higher societal
level. A politicized identity is by deﬁnition a dual identity in that it involves both identiﬁca-
tion with the aggrieved in-group and identiﬁcation with the more inclusive entity that
provides the context for shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and the ensuing power
struggle for social change (Simon and Ruhs 2008). (Simon and Ruhs 2008). Identity
processes play a crucial role in polarization as well. Research demonstrates that threats from
counter-movements can shape a movement’s collective identity (Einwohner 2002). First of
all, the presence of powerful opponents makes identities more salient for activists (Van Dyke
2003). Second, polarization implies a split in terms of friends and foes. Polarization, ﬁnally,
also induces a strategic reformulation of ‘who we are’. Einwohner (2002), for instance, shows
how radical animal rights activists responded to opponents’ claims that they were overly
emotional by presenting alternate identity characteristics to the public, while in private they
often embraced the ‘emotional’ characterization.
6 Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Sociology Compass (2014): 1–15, 10.1111/soc4.12157
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
Contextualizing radicalization
A ﬁnal step in substantiating my claim that there is no radicalization without identiﬁcation is
the contextualization of radicalization. Contextualization is crucial in the explanation of
radicalization, as characteristics of the socio-political context – both supranational and
national – may foster or hinder processes of radicalization. These are not simple mechanisms
as evidenced by the fact that people’s opinions, worries, and concerns are not linked in a
straightforward manner to the structural characteristics of the context in which they de-
velop. Take, f.i., the observation that while 9 percent of the French population is Muslim
compared to 5.8 percent of the Dutch population ( Q14Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larkin, 2010), 34
percent of French citizens display an unfavorable attitude toward Muslims compared to 51
percent of the Dutch (PEW, 2005). If structural factors such as actual diversity were the
only explanation for such intergroup attitudes, we would expect the French rather than
the Dutch to be more negative about Muslims and thus more susceptible to radical appeals.
If, on the other hand, perceived threat is a major factor, one could understand that after the
terrorist attacks in Madrid and London, Spanish (94 percent) and British (91 percent) citi-
zens were more worried about terrorism and thus susceptible to radical beliefs and actions,
but how can one make sense of the 96 percent of Portuguese who were even more
concerned about terrorism? Figures like these illustrate that one should be careful in relating
radicalization in a simple manner to characteristics of the socio-political context. Nor
should one be satisﬁed with static conceptions such as ‘terrorist personality’ ( Q15Taarnby,
2003, cited by Simon and Ruhs 2008) to explain radicalization. Hence, radicalization
should not be treated in social isolation, nor as a personality entity, yet explanations of
radicalization are in need of contextualization.
In contextualizing radicalization, identity plays again a crucial role. Matters of identity
become more problematic and unsettled as societies become more structurally differentiated,
fragmented, and culturally pluralistic, loosening in some instances and shattering in others the
cultural and structural harbors to which identities were once anchored, thus giving rise to the
construction, reconstitution, extension, negotiation, and challenge of various combinations
and permutations of identities (Snow 2013). The latter part of the 20th century has generally
been regarded as one such period of identity and collective identity effervescence and
clustering, with a number of scholars characterizing this period in terms of identity crises and
collective searches for identity ( Q16Barber 1992, Q17Castells 1997; Gergen 1991;
Q19
Giddens 1991).
Q18Supranational processes such as globalization, migration, and virtualization are seen to create
new tensions and frustrated groups that demand changes in their own (radical) way. Identities
become politically relevant, groups feel threatened or socially excluded, and grievances transfer
from one setting to the other and resonate in different contexts. These developments have
created a context wherein conﬂicts are partly rooted in local tensions and the workings of
national socio-political systems and partly in supranational contexts. Explanations of contem-
porary radicalization must therefore take national and supranational contexts into account.
Additionally, contemporary radicalization may result in the form of support for radical parties
and/or radical movement organizations. Hence, people can radicalize along two different
routes: through participation in radical political parties or through participation in radical social
movements (see also Jenkins and Klandermans’ diamond model 1995 and , Van Stekelenburg
and Klandermans 2013a,b
Q20
). The radical party route is often overlooked by social movement
scholars. Hutter and Kriesi (2013) argue that by neglecting this route, social movement scholars
tend to overlook the populist radical right parties. As a matter of fact, since the 1990s, Right-
Wing populist politics is well represented in national politics in many Western countries,
including France, the Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, and the like, and most recently in the
Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization 7
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United States with the Tea party. Figure F11 visualizes an interpretative framework for radicaliza-
tion that combines these two routes: taking supranational next to national contexts into account
and focusing on the political arena next to the social movement sector.
This interpretative framework for contextualized radicalization integrates inﬂuences from
the supranational, the national, and the mobilizing context. At a general level, radicalizing
demand, supply, and mobilization are supposedly shaped by the supranational and national
context. At a speciﬁc level, the mobilizing context is further colored by characteristics of
the political arena, the social movement sector, and the role of media. The framework
departs from the notion that supranational processes shape and mold the micro level of
(radicalizing) citizens’ demands, the meso level of social movements and political parties, and
the macro level of national political systems. The answer to questions such as who
radicalizes, why people radicalize, and the forms radical action takes lies in the interaction of
supranational processes, national political processes, and the context of political mobilization.
People can take two routes to radicalization: via party politics or movement politics.
NATION
repression 
citizenship 
regimes 
POLITICAL
PARTIES
SOCIAL 
MOVEMENTS
MEDIA
SUPPLY           (socio-political landscape) 
Globalization 
Migration  
Informatization
(RADICALIZING) DEMAND
Salient identities 
Social exclusion 
Perceived threats 
Figure 1 Contextualized routes to radicalization.
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National level
Radicalization has been thought to stem from a failure of the nation to absorb the demands
of frustrated, marginalized groups. The political opportunities and repression are identiﬁed as
determinants of the incidence and type of protest in democratic polities (Tarrow 1998).
Claims making by the extreme right, for instance, depends on a combination of discursive
opportunities deriving from the prevailing model of citizenship and the political opportuni-
ties made available by mainstream parties for far-right mobilization (Koopmans et al. 2005).
Repression might radicalize the protesting group and further unite those people who are
opposed to the state (Tarrow 1998). This is what Della Porta (1995) shows in her compara-
tive study between Germany and Italy: the more repressive the police, the more likely that
radical elements grow within the movement. Violence by the rebellious group tends to bring
repression, scaring away non-violent sympathizers, dividing the society, and resulting in a
small group of militants whose politics revolve around violence and who get trapped in a
violent conﬂict with state authorities. The main paradigm predicting radicalization in social
movement studies, departs from the so-called ‘end-of-protest-cycle argument’ (della Porta
1995). The end-of-protest-cycle argument roots in the notion that although violence tends
to appear from the very beginning of a protest cycle, the more dramatic forms of violence occur
when the mass phase of the protest cycle is over. Clashes with opponents or the police during
demonstrations are the more widely diffused types of political violence during the height of the
cycle. In the last phase, aggression carried out by small groups of militants and direct attacks on
persons become more frequent. Koopmans observes a similar pattern in the rise of racist and
extreme right violence in Germany (Koopmans 1997). Such violence as mobilization declines
is attributed to people’s dissatisfaction with protest outcomes and their attempts to compensate
for the “reduction in numbers” with increased radicalism (della Porta 1995), reinforced by a
repression apparatus that becomes more effective toward the end of a cycle.
Nation’s citizenship regimes also impact on radicalization through the formation of
identities. Indeed, European countries are experimenting with an array of integration
strategies, from extreme assimilation, that is, washing away intergroup differences to relativistic
multiculturalism, that is, cherishing the intergroup differences. These different citizenship
regimes evoke different identity formation strategies of migrants ( Q21Ersanilli and Saharso,
2012), which may foster or inhibit radicalization (Kinnvall and Nesbitt-Larkin, 2010).
Supranational level
Three supranational processes – globalization, migration, and virtualization – are thought to
shape and mold the micro, meso, and macro level of dynamics of radicalization.
Globalization
While the formation of supranational institutions like the United Nations or the World
Trade Organization has progressed rapidly, individual member states have undergone
uncertain internal transitions, take former Yugoslavia or the USSR for instance. There is a
tension between the relatively fast changes at the macro level and the slower pace of change
at the psychosocial level (Moghaddam 2008). These contradictory pressures are captured by
the concept of fractured globalization, that is, “the tendency for socio-cultural disintegration to
pull in a local direction at the same time that macro-economic and political systems are set up
to accelerate globalization. A result is that local languages and cultures are under threat”
(Moghaddam 2008, p. 13). “Just as globalization speeds ahead and group-based differences
Politicization, Polarization, and Radicalization 9
© 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Sociology Compass (2014): 1–15, 10.1111/soc4.12157
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
seem to be disappearing, there is also an ethnic revival and the re-emergence of ethnic pride
and ‘being different’” (Moghaddam 2008). With respect to identiﬁcation, the all inclusive
cosmopolitan identity seems to enhance the need to belong and thus strengthen the
perceived threats related to minority identities (Brewer 1991). Social movement literature
increasingly acknowledges that in response to globalization processes, social movement
activity is uploaded to the transnational level and at the same time downloaded to the local
level (e.g. della Porta et al. 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Processes of rapid diffusion and
scale shift are exempliﬁed by a global crisis of the ummah. This crisis is downloaded by
European Muslims who locally reinterpret. Local conﬂicts are also uploaded, as illustrated
by the Danish cartoon conﬂict. Clearly, the socio-political context in which movements
operate to spread their aims and ideas is neither exclusively national nor only supranational,
but a mix of supranational, national, and local settings.
Migration has increased the diversity of Western societies tremendously. Large groups of
people, both natives and migrants, try to protect their ways of life and compete for scarce
resources such as jobs and houses as well as for political inﬂuence (Koopmans and Olzak
2004). In this volatile context, intergroup conﬂicts increase the socio-political relevance
and psychological salience of collective identities and thus the likelihood that social groups
and their political entrepreneurs make collective claims and undertake attempts to mobilize
their members for (extreme) collective action (e.g. for natives see Klandermans and Mayer
2006 for immigrants see; Klandermans et al. 2008; Simon and Ruhs 2008). Moghaddam
(2008) argues that for a variety of reasons, Islamic terrorism will be a greater threat in Europe
than in the United States. He suggests a “distance-traveled hypothesis” (Moghaddam 2008,
p. 11), which proposes that the distance immigrants have to travel in order to settle in a host
country determines the (material, educational, and other) resources needed to succeed in the
migration. Muslims need to have more resources to move from the Middle East and North
Africa to settle in the United States than they do to settle in Europe. The greater resources of
American Muslims in part explain the greater success of Muslims in the United States,
particularly in terms of economic and educational attainment, relative to Muslims in Europe
(Moghaddam 2008). A lack of the resources that give access to the polity, on the other hand,
may be a reason to resort to violent action repertoires (della Porta 1995).
Virtualization stands for the inﬂuence of traditional and new media in radicalization.
Vliegenthart (2007) shows the tight reciprocal interaction between the political and media
debate and populist radical right parties’ support. He shows that traditional media as
newspapers and television are most strongly inﬂuenced by real-world developments,
especially events such as 9/11; the media in turn inﬂuence the parliamentary debate and
the public’s support for anti-immigrant parties. Thus, traditional media appear to play a
dominant role in radicalizing demand. However, next to the inﬂuence of traditional media,
I point to the inﬂuence of new media on radicalization. New Web technologies, like text
messaging, YouTube, discussion forums, and social networking sites play an important role
in contemporary mobilization and participation, both moderate and radical (Bennett and
Segerberg 2012; Earl and Kimport 2011; Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). The
internet makes self-organized action feasible, by on the one hand lowering information,
communication, and coordination costs, and on the other hand offering a space and tool
to produce, express, and perform (radical) political dissent (van Stekelenburg and
Klandermans, 2013). The Internet helps to steer loosely coupled structures (Lacquer 1999)
and make grievances, ideas, and ideologies travel rapidly from one context to the other.
The term ‘CNN effect’ has been coined to describe the inﬂuence of satellite news on
intergroup conﬂicts in other parts of the world: “The idea is that a global conscience comes
into being through the global mass media” (Moghaddam 2008, p. 128). Through satellite
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television and the Internet, people are more informed about the struggles of their brothers
and sisters worldwide with which they feel emotionally connected. New media spur
intergroup conﬂict because ‘explosive import products’ such as the war in Iraq or ﬁghts
between activists and the police during a G20 summit are vividly transmitted and facilitate
the creation of global activist identities such as the Black Bloc and Jihadi Muslims.
The Internet also augments activists’ tactical repertoire, be it ofﬂine actions that are
supported and facilitated by the Internet or online actions that are Internet-based (Van Laer
and Van Aelst 2010). Internet-supported actions involve the Internet as a device that
reinforces the traditional tools of organizers by making it easier to organize and coordinate.
Smartphones make it possible to continuously document activists ‘on the spot’ about actions
and interaction with the police and thereby change the tactics of groups like the ‘Black Bloc’
(McPhail and McCarthy 2005). Internet-based action involve the Internet’s function of
creating new and modiﬁed tactics as for instance online petitions, e-mail bombings and
hacktivism expanding the action toolkit of (radical) social movement organizations.
The Internet may also strengthen identiﬁcation, and thereby radicalization. This occurs
because online anonymity and reduced social cues decrease perceived differences among
members, foster identiﬁcation with a group, and reinforce group’s unity (Brunsting and
Postmes 2002). Through these processes, online groups create relatively underground
solidarity, which may contribute to participation in radical action. In addition to a relatively
underground shelter where feelings of solidarity and identiﬁcation can be nourished, the
Internet is a great resource for a wealth of cheap information, information which can be
combined in so-called cut-and-paste ideologies.
Together globalization, migration, and virtualization have a profound impact on what
citizens currently think, feel, and do. Today’s societies are increasingly described in
terms of uncertainties and threat (Moghaddam 2008), fears (Bauman 2006), and risk
(Beck 1992). Such collective fear enhances radicalization ( Q22Bar-Tal et al. 2007). Perceived
threat and social exclusion fuel radicalization especially if citizens do not trust their
government to solve their problems. Globalization and migration create dynamics that
serve to include some and exclude others in a connected but polarized global context.
It results in salient identities and ensuing clashes of ideologies (Moghaddam 2005,
2008). Often groups that experience threatened identities are less concerned with policy
and legalization than with cultural targets such as social norms, media representation,
and cultural messages about the group. These groups do not so much reﬂect a desire
to change government as they desire to create a cultural turn in which their cultural
norms are accepted and they are treated with respect and dignity. Van Stekelenburg
and Klandermans (2009) deﬁne this as a conﬂict of principle. Such conﬂicts easily turn
into ﬁerce confrontations as they cannot be solved by compromises like conﬂicts of
interest. In societies where “threat is in the air” (Moghaddam 2008), prejudice is high
(Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007), just like hate toward other groups (van
Stekelenburg et al. 2010), which fuels (radical) conﬂict behavior.
In sum
This essay demonstrates that identity processes are key to the process of radicalization. It
starts off with nesting the processes of politicization and polarization into radicalization.
It continues with demonstrating that within this trio, identity processes are crucial. In a
ﬁnal step, it is argued that the explanation of politicization, polarization, and radicalization
needs contextualization, as these processes are molded and shaped by contextual character-
istics; both supranational and national. It shows how processes of globalization, migration,
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and virtualization affect politicization, polarization, and radicalization simultaneously at the
micro level of citizens, the meso level of party and movement politics and the macro level
of national measures of repression and ‘safety’. It argues that identity plays a crucial role in
all levels. I hope this ‘roadmap’ has been useful in exemplifying and relating the multitude–
multilevel explanations for radicalization, and substantiates my claim that single level
explanations are not able to capture the complex process of radicalization. Obviously, it
is not more than a descriptive start, in need of empirical scrutiny. The last words will be
devoted to where I think the lacunas are. What are the challenges scientiﬁc explanations
of radicalization face? I will mention a few and there might be (much!) more.
To start with the claim that identiﬁcation is crucial for radicalization. But what about the
so-called lone wolves? They are not part of a group, but they are expected to strongly iden-
tify with a group or category. A lone wolf in the context of terrorism doesn’t mean a loner
who acts completely on his own and without any reference outside. “A lone wolf comes
with an ideological background and he has contact with other extremists, but he is not a part
of a command structure, he is not a part of an organization that conducts terrorism. In the
words of Verta Taylor (2013), they are part of a discursive community. So, you could have
an Islamist lone wolf who is a part of an Islamist ideological framework, but he is not a
member of Al-Qaeda for instance, or you could have a Right-Wing extremist who conducts
terrorism but is not a part of an organization, but he also draws his ideas from somewhere”.2
The Danish security police have warned against exactly that kind of a mixture, a threat from
people who are not necessarily a part of a group but they create their own frames and then,
they conduct terrorism or violence on that basis.3
The forwarded framework presumes that there are two routes to radicalization: party
politics and movement politics. Little is known about how these routes vary or interact,
how such variation is determined, or how it impacts on who radicalizes, for what reasons
and why people take the one route rather than the other. And how identity processes differ,
to what extend does identiﬁcation with a party or a social movement organization differs?
And how does that affect their feelings, thoughts and behavior? Of course, in trying to
achieve social change people will attempt to keep their costs and their risks to a minimum
(cf. McAdam 1986). Therefore, one can expect that citizens demanding radical social
change initially prefer the low costs/risks route of party politics. However, this is only
possible if there is a supply of radical party politics that impresses as effective. Q23Kriesi’s
(2009) suggestion that the extreme right mobilizes via party politics seems to be conﬁrmed
by the supply of populist extreme right political parties in many European countries. The
radical left, on the other hand, tends to choose movement politics. Hence, movement pol-
itics have been dominated by the so-called ‘left-libertarian movement family’ (della Porta
and Rucht 1995), although in the United States, we do encounter radical right movements
(f.i. anti-abortion and recently the so-called Tea party, a radical right anti-government
campaign). Thus, I expect the radical left such as the ‘Autonomous’ Black Block to opt
for the movement route, if only because globalization has made them critical to the
legitimacy of democracy. This might also be a reason why Islamic Jihadi’s opt for the social
movement route. However, the potential differentiated role identity plays in these routes is
an unanswered question.
A ﬁnal interesting issue is the relation between the two routes. As far as moderate political
participation is concerned, the two routes have always been intimately related. That is to say,
people who participate in party politics are also likely to participate in movement politics
(Barnes and Kaase 1979). However, if the route via the political representational system does
not live up to citizens’ expectations, chances are that the protest route via social movements will
be used more frequently. This raises the question whether the two routes for radical political
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participation are as intimately related as those for moderate forms of participation and to what
extent failing radical party politics would similarly make people shift to movement politics.
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